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PROPTER HONORIS RESPECTUM
DISCOURSE AND ITS DISCONTENTS
Frederick Schauer*
Discourse is in the air. From a host of perspectives, and employ-
ing diverse methodologies, numerous political, legal, moral, and so-
cial theorists have been, for a decade or more, advocating and
celebrating the virtues of citizen discourse. These theorists have
stressed the role of discourse in forging social consensus, in locating
and defining political and moral truth, and in fostering respect for
those whose cultures and world views are different from our own. Dis-
course, it appears, may help us to cure a multitude of social ills.
Yet if discourse, or its virtual synonyms deliberation and dialogue, is
such a transcendent human good, then why has its importance only
recently been discovered? More to the point, if discourse is so plainly
desirable, why has it been so necessary for theorists to argue for its
adoption?' One possible answer to these questions, of course, is that
the personal interests of those with social power have led them to im-
pede the fostering of institutions of public discourse. If discourse is a
vehicle for an egalitarian consensus, for example, then we should not
* Frank Stanton Professor of the First Amendment and Academic Dean, John F.
Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. Earlier versions of this Article
have been presented at the New York University Colloquium on Constitutional
Theory, the University of Utah College of Law, the Faculty of Law of the Australian
National University, and the Faculty of Philosophy of Monash University. The
comments of Tom Campbell, Gary King, Larry Kramer, and Richard Parker have
assisted me immensely, as have extensive discussions with Dennis Thompson. And I
cheerfully acknowledge the support of the Joan Shorenstein Center on the Press,
Politics and Public Policy. Most of all, however, I am grateful to the Notre Dame Law
Review for the extraordinary honor that this Propter Honoris Respectum volume
represents, and to the scholars who have honored me by contributing to this issue, at
the expense of their own agendas, in order to comment so fruitfully and helpfully on
mine.
1 It is worth asking-perhaps with a touch of irony-whether the recent dis-
course about discourse has produced the effects that might have been anticipated on
the basis of the underlying substantive claims that have been made about discourse.
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be surprised when those in the upper reaches of an inegalitarian hier-
archy attempt to hold back the progress of egalitarianism.
Another possibility, however, has received considerably less atten-
tion. This is the possibility that discourse may be less of an unalloyed
virtue than most of its proponents suppose. It is this possibility that I
wish to explore here, particularly in the context of considering various
discourse-dependent accounts of the underlying philosophical foun-
dations for the principle of freedom of speech. The key to my critique
of some strands of contemporary discourse theory will be the banal
point that discourse is centrally about talking. At one level the claim
that discourse is about talking is a vacuous truism. Yet at another level
the point that discourse is talk is often obscured by more grandilo-
quent terms like "discourse," "dialogue," and "deliberation," for often
these terms keep us from recognizing that "talking about it" is only
one among numerous different ways of making a decision and coming
to a conclusion. If we take talking to be one among many contingent
devices of institutional design, we can then compare talking to other
decisionmaking devices, and we can at least consider the possibility
that more talk is not always better than less talk (or more of some-
thing else) in promoting better decisionmaking. If this is so, then
decisionmaking by public discourse may not always be preferable to
decisionmaking without discourse, a conclusion that the existence of
the institution of the secret ballot may usefully underscore. Talk can,
at times, be the vehicle of dissensus as well as of consensus, and talk
can be an instrument of domination as well as an instrument for re-
sisting it.
When we sort out what the claims of discourse are all about, we
may find ourselves with a more skeptical attitude towards it, but pro-
moting an extremely skeptical view of discourse is not my aim here.
Still, insofar as one of the conclusions of this Article is that the prac-
tice of discourse is more continuous with life in general than its pro-
ponents often acknowledge, the conclusion will appear skeptical to
many, and more skeptical than justified to some. But my goal here is
not to argue that discourse is always or even usually to be avoided.
Nor is it to claim that less discourse is typically preferable to more. My
goal is, however, to maintain that discourse is part and parcel of all
that is good and bad about social existence, for all its messiness, and
that it therefore may involve more disadvantages and fewer advantages
than many of discourse's most enthusiastic proponents appear to be-
lieve. I will thus argue that discourse, for all its virtues, may embody
rather than transcend all that is good-and bad-about the world we
inhabit, and is thus less self-evidently the key to a better world than
might sometimes appear to be the case. And if discourse is better
[VOL- 72:51310
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seen as embodying rather than transcending the range of virtues and
pathologies of our collective existence, then we may have lost the
purchase necessary to support the claim that the promotion and pro-
tection of discourse-another way of characterizing the goal of a the-
ory of free speech-is a value of supra-political significance.
I
I will continue to speak primarily of "discourse" and not of "delib-
eration," despite the fact that the latter term is more prevalent than
the former in contemporary political and legal theory.2 Although a
group of people can deliberate, as when ajury deliberates prior to de-
livering a verdict, when a family deliberates about where to spend its
next vacation, and when a faculty deliberates about whom to appoint
to its ranks, it is no linguistic error to refer to the non-communicative
deliberations of a single individual, as when a person deliberates to
herself before choosing the best course of action from among several
available to her. There is a sense of the word "deliberate" in which
the best synonym is "consider" or "contemplate" or even 'judge."3 Be-
cause of this linguistic ambiguity between inter-personal and intra-per-
sonal deliberation, therefore, and because the proponents of a
deliberative view about political organization and political value for-
mation typically appear to have something particularly collective, col-
laborative, and communicative in mind, I will use the word
"discourse" to encompass what some theorists do call "discourse,"4
others call "deliberation," and still others call "dialogue."5
2 See, e.g., JAMEs S. FISHKIN, DEMOCRACY AND DELIBERATION (1991); Jane J. Man-
sbridge, A Deliberative Theoy of Interest Representation, in THE POLITICS OF INTERESTs 32
(Mark P. Petracca ed., 1992); GEORGE F. WILL, RESTORATION: CONGRESS, TERM Lrmrrs
AND THE RECOvERY OF DEIJBERATVE DEMOCRACy (1992); David M. Estlund, Who's
Afraid of Deliberative Democracy? On the Strategic/Deliberative Dichotomy in Recent Constitu-
tionalJurisprudence, 71 TEx. L. REv. 1437 (1993).
3 Indeed, although the Oxford English Dictionary does include within the defi-
nitions of the verb "deliberate" the idea of a "body of persons ... tak[ing] counsel
together" in "considering and examining the reasons for and against a proposal or
course of action," the first listed definition of the verb is "[t]o weigh in the mind; to
consider carefully with a view to decision; to think over." 4 OxFoRo ENGLISH DICTION-
ARY 413-14 (2d ed. 1989).
4 See, e.g., Jfirgen Habermas, Discourse Ethics: Notes on a Program of Philosophical
Justfication, in THE COMMUNICATIVE ETHICS CoNTRovxWs 60 (Seyla Benhabib & Fred
Dallmayr eds., 1990).
5 See, e.g.,JAMEs FISHEiN, THE DIALOGUE OFJUSTICE (1992); Bruce Ackerman, hy
Dialogue?, 86 J. PHIL. 5 (1989); Robert Post, Managing Deliberation: The Quandary of
Democratic Dialogue, 103 ETHICS 654 (1993).
1997] 1311
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
I am concerned here neither with Arrow's Theorem6 nor with
any of the related issues about the extent to which multiple deci-
sionmakers with multiple goals can be said to have (or not to have)
some collective view about a policy or a decision.7 Rather, I am con-
cerned with the process by which communication among multiple
decisionmakers is treated as being antecedent to an outcome or a de-
cision in the process of institutional design. The final outcome or
decision might come from a vote taken after communication, or
might emerge less formally as the product of the process of give-and-
take, modification, and compromise that we typically call a consensus.
For simplicity I will preliminarily define discourse as a decisionmaking
process in which communication among decisionmakers is a necessary
component and a temporal antecedent to a decision, and in which at
least a majority of the relevant decisionmakers as a result of their in-
teractive communication come to some agreement about what is the
case (whether of fact or of value) or about what to do.8
An interactive communicative process that culminates in a collec-
tive decision, however, is merely one among a multiplicity of plausible
decision procedures. Indeed, as a way of highlighting the contin-
gency of a discursive view about decisionmaking, it might be useful to
distinguish (at least) five different public decision procedures. One,
the most open form of deliberative and democratic decisionmaking, is
best represented by the deliberations of a jury and by the New Eng-
6 See KENNETH ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2d ed. 1963).
7 I bracket Arrow's Theorem and related matters (on which, see, e.g., MANCUR
OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1960)) not because I believe Arrow's The-
orem wrong or irrelevant, and not because I believe collective action difficulties are
unrelated to discourse theory, but because I do not possess the competence to delve
into the issue with any degree of sophistication. My instinct is to believe that Arrow's
Theorem has more to do with discourse theory than much of the existing literature
supposes, although it is an open and difficult question whether Arrow's Theorem and
related difficulties of collective choice would undercut the alleged virtues of dis-
course, or whether, instead, discourse is a way of transcending those very difficulties.
See David Miller, Deiberative Democracy and Social Chice, 40 POL. STUD. 54 (1992) (spec.
issue). Less directly, see also Joshua Cohen, An Epistemic Conception of Democracy, 97
ETHICS 26 (1986); Jules Coleman & John Ferejohn, Democracy and Social Choice, 97
ETHICS 6 (1986).
8 My concern here is with talk as a device of institutional design in general, and
free speech as a principle of institutional design in general, and not only with talking
and the special protection of talk as a part of the form of political organization we call
"democracy." For a valuable skeptical view about the role of deliberation in democ-
racy, and one to which I am much indebted, see James A. Gardner, Shut Up and Vote: A
Critique of Deliberative Democracy and the Life of Talk, 63 TENN. L. REV. 421 (1996).
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land town meeting as celebrated by Alexander Meiklejohn.9 Under
this model, proposals are made by members of the decisionmaking
group, openly debated (the discourse) by that group, and are then
voted upon in a non-secret ballot, or, as in many committee meetings,
discussed until a point of consensus is reached. The key features are
inclusiveness, openness in discussion, and openness in the "end
game" of actually coming to a decision.
In contrast to this model is a second and different process that
employs discourse prior to the moment of decision, but which em-
ploys a non-open final decisionmaking process. More concretely, this
is the process of deliberative democracy without open voting-delib-
erative democracy with a secret ballot. This decision procedure,
which captures the mode ordinarily used in most democracies and
which is sometimes employed injury deliberations, allows (or encour-
ages) face-to-face or more impersonal (such as through the mass me-
dia) communication, but then actually makes its decisions by secret
ballot.' 0 When the discussion ends, therefore, the actual decision is
individual rather than collective.
To be contrasted with both of these models is a third model that
we might call non-deliberative democracy, where decisions are not
only made by secret ballot, but also where the secret ballot is not pre-
ceded by discourse or discussion."1 Voting, therefore, is used under
this procedure as a measure of the antecedent, pre-deliberative pref-
erences of the relevant constituency. Many forms of formal and infor-
mal opinion polling might fit this model, for although the
9 E.g., ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, PoLrrIcAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL Pow-
ERS OF THE PEOPLE (1965); Alexander Meiklejohn, The Balancing of Self-Preservation
Against Political Freedom, 49 CAL. L. REv. 4 (1961); Alexander Meiklejohn, The First
Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. REv. 245. For the moment I am referring to
Meiklejohn's archetype, and not the divergence between the archetype and what in
fact happens at New England town meetings. On the latter, see JANE MANSBRiDGE,
BEYOND ADVERSARY DEMOCRACY (1980).
10 The secret ballot has traditionally been viewed as a device to facilitate "the free
expression of the public will." E.C. EvANs, A HISTORY OF THE AUSTRALIAN BALLOT
SYSTEM IN THE UNrrED STATES 72 (1917). For a much more skeptical view of the ad-
vantages that a secret ballot is commonly thought to bring, see Geoffrey Brennan &
Philip Pettit, Unveiling the Vote, 20 BRrr. J. POL. Sci. 311 (1990).
11 Some would insist that this procedure is not deserving of the name "democ-
racy" at all and would take discourse as a necessary criterion for proper use of the
word "democracy." See Post, supra note 5; Robert Post, Meiklejohn's Mistake: Individual
Autonomy and the Reform of Public Discourse, 64 U. COLO. L. REv. 1109 (1993). For my
purposes, however, such a definition of "democracy" is question-begging, and I will
followJon Elster and others in defining "democracy" as "simple majority rule, based
on the principle 'One person one vote.'" Jon Elster, Introduction, in CONSTTtTONL-
ISM AND DEMOCRACY 1, 1 (Jon Elster & Rune Slagstad eds., 1988).
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preferences sampled in a poll may be the product of some form of
previous deliberation, the typical sampling does not deem it necessary
to ensure that there has been discussion among the members of the
sampled population. Moreover, many traditional discussions of utili-
tarianism implicitly assume this model since those discussions focus
on the preferences of the population in a way that rarely takes ac-
count of the fluidity of the preferences and the sensitivity of those
preferences to policy, rather than the other way around.
12
Not all decisionmaking procedures are democratic, of course,
and so a fourth model would simply be one of non-deliberative and
non-democratic decisionmaking, a model under which some deci-
sionmaker simply consults her own judgment and resources to make
the decision she believes best. It may seem odd to include such indi-
vidual (authoritarian?/autocratic?/totalitarian?) forms of decision-
making within this discussion, but I do so for two reasons. First, if
deliberation is seen as a way of locating rather than of defining (polit-
ical) truth,' 3 then from the perspective of an institutional designer
who may believe she has some ability to identify truth, it is an open
question whether she should put in place a mechanism she believes
will be less effective than her own bestjudgment. Second, identifying
the possibility of non-discursive decisionmaking helps us to identify a
fifth model, a decisionmaking method that is deliberative but non-
democratic. Here we have decisionmaking that is preceded by dis-
course of some form, but in which the speakers are not part of the
final decisionmaking process. Although the standard picture of delib-
eration supposes that the deliberators are also the decisionmakers, the
two functions need not necessarily be conjoined. Most courts fit this
model, for there is an opportunity for discussion and argument, but
those deliberating and arguing have no vote in the process. Less be-
nignly, perhaps, monarchies with well-entrenched free speech and
free press ideals would also appear to fit this model, for again we have
a decisionmaker who is willing to listen to speech, and possibly even to
engage in discourse with the speakers, but is not willing to relinquish
the prerogative of making the final decision, a decision that will be
binding on the speakers even if it is inconsistent with the views they
have expressed in their speech.
12 This theme is at the center of many of the contributions to FOUNDATIONS OF
SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY (Jon Elster & Aanund Hylland eds., 1986) and INTERPER-
SONAL COMPARISONS OF WELL-BEING (Jon Elster &John E. Roemer eds., 1991). See also
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONsTrrUTION 162-94 (1993).
13 On this distinction, and on its implications for free speech theory, see FREDER-
ICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 19-22 (1982).
[VOL- 72:51314
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The widespread presence of secret ballot procedures, as well as
respectable exemplars of all of the other decision procedures I have
just listed, suggests that modem democratic institutions have inher-
ited a range of procedures, not all of them self-evidently pernicious,
and not all of them necessarily incorporating the maximal amount of
openness and discourse in their methods. Such discourse-averse pro-
cedures may be for that reason deficient. But recognizing their exist-
ence shows that the debate about discourse (the discourse about
discourse, if you will) is not a debate between discourse and Hitlerian
tyranny, or a debate between democracy and authoritarianism.
Rather, it is a debate about the extent to which talk as a decisionmak-
ing device should be more or less incorporated into decisionmaking,
including, but not limited to, democratic decisionmaking, with a host
of historical examples suggesting that there is a genuine debate to be
had.
Despite the respectability of discourse-averse decision proce-
dures, it is not my purpose to argue against discourse or dialogue as a
decision procedure. It is my purpose, however, to argue that treating
discourse as presumptively superior is questionable, as is the entrench-
ment of principles (such as almost all versions of a free speech princi-
ple) that would assume acontextually that discourse and its promotion
are, ceteris pa-ribu, worthy of active promotion and special protection.
Thus, the attitude I propose with respect to discourse is one of agnos-
ticism rather than hostility, and I will argue that there is no more rea-
son to suppose that discourse is acontextually undesirable than that it
is acontextualy desirable. But if we deflate some of the grandest
claims that have been made on behalf of discourse, we may be better
situated to evaluate when discourse will be a desirable decision proce-
dure, and when it will not be.
My concern with discourse is partly a function of an interest in
the use of discourse as a device of institutional design, especially in
light of the frequency with which political and constitutional ideas
and ideals find their way down to micro-level questions of decision-
making procedure.14 My concern is also related to an interest in the
way in which discourse theory occupies an increasingly large segment
14 Consider, for example, the extent to which the norms of criminal procedure-
presumption of innocence, proof beyond a reasonable doubt, right to counsel, etc.-
have, largely with the assistance of television, often over-informed the design of non-
governmental institutions concerned with the determination of what has happened.
On this, see Frederick Schauer & Richard Zeckhauser, On the Degree of Confidencefor
Adverse Decisions, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 27 (1996).
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of moral, political, legal, and social theory.' 5 But my primary concern
here is with the relation between discourse theory and free speech
theory, for, with the exception of theories protecting speech specially
because of its self-expressive aspects, 16 a quite large portion of free
speech theory turns out to be dependent on theories of discourse
closely related to those now being celebrated. 17 Some of this free
speech theory is expressly related to modern discourse theory,' 8 but it
15 For many, the sacred texts are by Habermas. JORGEN HABERMS, BETWEEN
FACTS AND NoRms (1996);Jfirgen Habermas, DiscourseEthics, in MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS
AND COMMUNICATIVE ACTION (Christian Lenhardt & Shierry Weber Nicholsen trans.,
1993);Jfirgen Habermas, Human Rights and Popular Sovereignty: The Liberal and Republi-
can Versions, 7 RATIojuRIs 1 (1994);Jfirgen Habermas, Reconciliation Through the Use of
Public Reason: Remarks on John Rawls'Political Liberalism, 92J. PHIL. 109 (1995);Jfirgen
Habermas, Three Normative Models offDemocracy, 1 CONSTELLATIONS 1 (1994). A broader
sample of contemporary discourse theory would include strands of contemporary
feminist theory (see, e.g., CAROLE PATEMAN, PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY
(1970); IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE (1990)), empiri-
cal political science (see, e.g., JANE J. MANSBRIDGE, BEYOND ADVERSARY DEMOCRACY
(1980)), liberal political and democratic theory (see, e.g., FISHKIN, supra note 2; AMY
GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT (1996); Joshua Co-
hen, Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy, in THE GOOD POLrY NORMATIVE ANALYSIS
OF THE STATE 17 (Alan P. Hamlin & Philip Pettit eds., 1989); David Ingram, The Limits
and Possibilities of Communicative Ethics for Democratic Theory, 21 POL. THEORY 294
(1993)), republican legal or political theory (see, e.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note 12; Frank I.
Michelman, Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REv. 4 (1986)), and more
traditional jurisprudence (see, e.g., ROBERT ALEXY, A THEORY OF LEGAL ARGUMENTA-
TION (Neil MacCormick & Ruth Adler trans., 1989)).
16 See, e.g., C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH (1989); MAR-
TIN H. REDISH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS (1984); DAVID AJ. RICH-
ARDS, TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION (1986); C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First
Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REv. 964 (1978); Martin H. Redish, The Value
of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 591 (1982). I do not believe that such arguments can
maintain a distinct principle of freedom of speech, but I will not repeat arguments I
have made elsewhere. See SCHAUER supra note 13, at ch. 4; Frederick Schauer, Must
Speech Be Special?, 78 Nw. U. L. REv. 1284 (1983); cf. Frederick Schauer, The Phenome-
nology of Speech and Harm, 103 ETHICS 635 (1993) [hereinafter Schauer, The Phenome-
nology of Speech and Harm].
17 Even theories of toleration, see LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT Socm'Y
FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXTREMIST SPEECH IN AMERICA (1986), may have a discourse-
dependent conception of why tolerating harmful behavior is a good thing. See David
A. Strauss, Why Be Tolerant?, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1485 (1986). And even theories of
autonomy, see Thomas Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
204 (1972), are dependent on a certain conception of how the process of persuasion
works. See David A. Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression, 91 COLUM.
L. REV. 334 (1991).
18 See, e.g., Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous
Opinion, Democratic Deliberation and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L. REV. 601
(1990); Cass R. Sunstein, Free Speech Now, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 255 (1992).
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turns out that almost all of the justifications for a free speech princi-
ple are premised on a similar vision of the communicative process,' 9
and it is that vision that I want to explore here. For whether it be the
classical argument from truth-associated in different versions with
John Milton,20 John Stuart Mill,21 Walter Bagehot,
22 Karl Popper,23
Learned Hand,24 and many others25 -that posits that truth will best
emerge from an unregulated marketplace of ideas, 26 or the argument
from democracy (of which many contemporary arguments from dis-
course are a variant) that sees unregulated public communication
about values and goals as an essential component of democracy,27 the
basic idea is that restrictions on the (negative) liberty to communicate
will produce, in the aggregate, worse outcomes than would be pro-
duced by the unregulated communicative or discursive domain. The
identification of truth and the exposure of error, the central goals of
classical marketplace theory, can best be seen as a subset of the larger
set of desirable outcomes potentially produced by some decision pro-
cedure, and whatjoins the marketplace of ideas theory of free speech
with the democratic decisionmaking theory of free speech is that both
are committed to the proposition that discursive openness in decision-
making, and the use of dialogue in decisionmaking, will, in the aggre-
19 See supra note 18.
20 John Milton, Areopagitica, in MILTON'S PROSE 297 (J.M. Patrick ed., 1968).
21 JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY ch. 2 (John Gray & G.W. Smith eds., 1991)
(1859).
22 Walter Bagehot, The Metaphysical Basis of Toleration, in LrIERARv STUDIES 422
(R.H. Hutton ed., 1884).
23 KARL POPPER, TH-E OPEN Socx-rr AND ITS ENEMIs (5th ed. 1966).
24 See, e.g., International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 181 F.2d 34 (2d Cir.
1950); see also United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1950), aff'd, 341 U.S. 494
(1951).
25 On the relationship between discourse theory and marketplace of ideas or
search for truth theory, I am indebted to Thomas Christiano, Deliberative Equality and
Democratic Order, in XXXVIII NOMOS (PoLITICAL ORDER) 251, 268-75 (Ian Shapiro &
Russell Hardin eds., 1996), even though my conclusions diverge considerably from
Christiano's.
26 See William P. Marshall, In Defense of the Search for Truth as a First Amendment
Justification, 30 GA. L. REv. 1 (1995).
27 In addition to the contributions of Alexander Meiklejohn, see supra note 10,
see also CAsS R. SUNsTEIN, DEMOCRACy AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH (1993); Wil-
liamJ. Brennan,Jr., The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First Amend-
ment, 79 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1965); Harry Kalven, Jr., The New York Times Case: A Note on
"The Central Meaning of the trst Amendment," 1964 SuP. CT. REv. 191; Pnina Lahav,
Holmes and Brandeis: Libertarian and Republican Justificationsfor Free Speech, 4J.L. & POL.
451 (1988); William Marshall, Free Speech and the "Problem" of Democracy, 89 Nw. U. L.
REv. 191 (1994) (book review).
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gate, produce better outcomes than will the avoidance of such
methods.
Underlying this proposition, I want to maintain, is at least one
and possibly more among several assumptions about the role of pri-
vate power in the communicative process, and each of these assump-
tions deserves closer scrutiny. In so scrutinizing the traditional
assumptions about the comparative non-importance of disparities of
non-governmental communicative competence and power, I will, as I
have said, collapse some of the important distinctions between classi-
cal marketplace of ideas theory-truth will be most likely to emerge
from an unregulated exchange of ideas2 8-and more contemporary
emphases on discourse, dialogue, and public deliberation.2 9 I do this
because, for all their differences, the two seemingly different ap-
proaches share the same vision of the communicative process.
Whether the consensus consequent upon public discourse is seen as
constitutive of truth, or public values, as the earlier Habermas and the
later Holmes would have it, or whether public deliberation is seen,
more plausibly, as merely a necessary but not a sufficient condition for
the identification of public truth,30 the persistent vision is of a process
of engaged public communication more likely than any alternative to
produce sound results, where there is, in theory, a measure of the
soundness of the result logically independent of its success in the dis-
cursive arena. In this respect, the question both for modern discourse
theory and for classical marketplace of ideas theory is whether the
governmentally-unimpeded process that both revere contains those
properties providing some basis for at least comparative confidence in
its output. So although I will focus more on the epistemological ver-
sion of the argument from communicative freedom, the argument
that the lack of governmental regulation can be predicted to produce
in the long run better results (more truths located, and fewer false-
hoods accepted) than its alternative, much that I say is equally applica-
28 See especially Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting) ("[T] he best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted
in the competition of the market"). For a critique, see Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace
of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE LJ. 1.
29 For a similar conjunction, see David 0. Brink, Mill's Deliberative Utilitarianism,
21 PHIL. & PUB. AlF. 67 (1992).
30 See Janna Thompson, A Defense of Communicative Ethics, 1 J. POL. PHIL. 262
(1993);Janna Thompson, A Defense of Discourse Ethics (1993) (unpublished manu-
script, on file with author). Some may believe that I am too dismissive of views hold-
ing that discourse is in some way constitutive of truth. The topic does deserve a more
extensive discussion, but it might be worthwhile noting here that if discourse is consti-
tutive of political truth, then it is not clear where the participants in that discourse get
the purchase for what they say.
1318 [VOL- 72:5
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ble to the argument that an entrenched principle of governmentally-
unimpeded public deliberation is entitled to special solicitude in the
design of public institutions.
II
To repeat, I do not intend to argue that discussion, deliberation,
discourse, and the exchange of ideas are bad. I do intend, however,
to suggest that there may be good reasons, as a matter of institutional
design, to question an ex ante assumption of superiority for a discur-
sive decisionmaking procedure over a non-discursive one. I also want
to argue that treating discursive processes as entitled to special immu-
nity from official intervention (a way of recasting the Free Speech
Principle so that its relevance to a wider range of questions of institu-
tional design is more apparent) rests on at least one of several assump-
tions, some seemingly highly questionable, about just what a
communicative environment-or a public deliberation-looks like
when the government or any other putative controller or regulator
remains uninvolved. I thus use the window of free speech theory as a
way of thinking more broadly about the nature of discursive
decisionmaking.
Let me then turn to the assumptions implicit, and at times ex-
plicit, in the view that discourse-speech of a certain kind-is, just
because of its speechness, entitled to a special immunity from other-
wise applicable principles of state intervention. One possible assump-
tion is what we might call the assumption of equality. Not entirely
unrelated to the Habermasian ideal-speech situation, the assumption
of equality assumes that, in the absence of governmental intervention,
all of the participants in an exchange of views are of roughly similar
ability to speak and roughly similar ability to understand, that neither
the making nor the understanding of communications are distorted
by bias, and that all of the participants in the deliberation will evaluate
with care and sympathy the utterances of all others. In this context,
we might assume truth, and certainly political truth, would indeed be
most likely to emerge. Without this assumption, however, it seems ini-
tially that the instrumental optimism surrounding the standard argu-
ments for open discussion is in need of explanation that is not to be
found in the existing literature.
One of the most obvious things to notice about the assumption of
equality, of course, is that it is false.3 ' As the current debates about
31 For a sampling of the numerous slants on the same basic idea, see RONALD K.L.
COLLINS & DAVID SKOVEp, THE DEATH OF DISCOURSE (1996); ROBERT ENTMAN, DEMOC-
RACY WITHOUT CITIZENS: MEDIA AND THE DECAY OF AMEICAN PoLrIcs (1989); OWEN
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the role of money in political campaigning and political advertising
make stunningly clear,3 2 resources matter, and more resources matter
more.33 Indeed, the current debates about tobacco and alcohol ad-
vertising make it increasingly difficult to discount the importance of
resources in preference formation. Moreover, not all speakers are
equally articulate or persuasive, and not all listeners are equally under-
standing. We have recognized that issues of race, gender, class and
many others can hardly be thought of as irrelevant in a communica-
tive environment, and hardly irrelevant in determining who talks, who
listens, and who gets listened to.34 In terms of who actually speaks,
and of who actually listens, and of what a listener actually takes away
from the speaker's speech, therefore, there seems little reason to be-
lieve that all of the inequalities of society in general are not replicated
in the context of deliberation. Indeed, even when such inequalities
are lessened, the dynamics of the communicative process itself may
engender more pessimism than optimism about the possibility that
the process will focus on a correct outcome. 35 And if this is so, then it
seems as a first cut strange to believe this process is any more likely to
ameliorate than to exacerbate the existing inequalities in a society,
and equally strange to believe that this process is one deserving of
special or antecedent solicitude (as compared, for example, to more
controlled communicative environments) in the search for moral,
political, or factual truth.
Fiss, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH (1996); CATHARINE MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODI-
FIED: DIscouRsEs ON LIFE AND LAW (1987); Mary Becker, Conservative Free Speech and the
Uneasy Case for Judicial Review, 64 U. COLO. L. REv. 975 (1993); Owen Fiss, Why the
State?, 100 HARv. L. REV. 781 (1987); Frederick Schauer, The Political Incidence of the
Free Speech Principle, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 935 (1993).
32 See BENJAMIN PAGE, WHO DELIBERATES? (1996); Symposium, Campaign Finance
Reform, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 1018 (1994); see also Cotton M. Lindsay & Michael T. Malo-
ney, Party Politics and the Price of Payola, 26 ECON. INQUIRY 203 (1988); Al Wilhite &
John Theilmann, Campaign Contributions by Political Parties: Ideology vs. Winning, ATLAN-
Tic ECON. J., June 1989, at 11.
33 For examples of some of the literature, see DORIS GRABER, MASS MEDIA AND
AMERICAN POLITIcs (4th ed. 1993); W. RussELL NEUMAN, THE PARADOX OF MASS POLI-
TiCS (1986); JOHN ZALLER, THE NATURE AND ORIGINS OF MASS OPINION (1992); Scott
Althaus, Opinion Polls, Information Effects, and Political Equality: Exploring Ideological Bi-
ases in Collective Opinion, 13 POL. COMMENTARY 3 (1996); Robert S. Erikson, The Influ-
ence of Newspaper Endorsements in Presidential Elections, 20 AM. J. POL. Sci. 207 (1976).
34 See the survey in Chingching Chang &Jacqueline Hitchon, Mass Media Impact
on Voter Response to Women Candidates: Theoretical Development, 7 CoMM. THEORY 29
(1997).
35 SeeAlvin I. Goldman &James C. Cox, Speech, Truth, and the Free Market for ldeas,
2 LEGAL THEORY 1 (1996).
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Now it may seem odd to evaluate a philosophical position in-
tended as ideal theory by reference to the non-ideality of the world we
currently inhabit. Sophisticated discourse theorists recognize the
pathologies and defects of our existing discursive environment, yet be-
lieve it important to retain the discursive idea as an aspiration that
guides the formation of constitutional doctrine as well as political the-
ory.36 Yet if we are employing, even aspirationally, something analo-
gous to an ideal-speech situation, to employ Habermas's term, even
while recognizing that it does not currently exist, it seems peculiar to
allow an aspirational assumption of ideality for non-governmental
communicators and their relations with each other, while not allowing
such an aspirational assumption for government itself. In an ideal
world, the state would have no reason to interfere with the delibera-
tions and communications of its equally idealized citizens, and if it
did, it would do so only to achieve legitimate purposes, and no other.
Thus, it is not clear that in an ideal setting there would ever be a need
for a second-order principle of free speech premised on comparative
governmental inability to regulate speech, and thus not clear why
there would be a need for a principle that would preclude the state
from doing what the ideal state would not attempt to do, or that
would preclude the ideal state from doing what it would have, ex hy-
pothesi, good first-order reasons for doing. Thus, the observation of
non-ideality about the communicative settings that actually exist is not
a too-easy cheap shot about the limitations of ideal theory, but rather
one about the question-begging peculiarity of stipulating a counterfac-
tual equality for speakers -while not stipulating an equivalent
counterfactual benignness of government. For by stipulating the for-
mer and not the latter, we take off the table the very questions that
instrumental free speech theory must address-whether the interven-
tions of admittedly non-ideal governments can systematically be ex-
pected to be more harmful to the truth-finding process than the
distortions occasioned by the operation of equally non-ideal inequali-
ties and other misuses of communicative power in the deliberative set-
ting; and whether the promotion of discourse under non-ideal
conditions will tend towards ideality, or instead merely exacerbate the
conditions that made the conditions non-ideal in the first place.
One response to this argument could be that the distortions in
communicative ability or in listener comprehension are of less conse-
quence than the response to the assumption of equality would sup-
pose. To put it differently, the stress on inequality of resources, and
36 See, e.g., Robert C. Post, Racist Speech, Democracy, and the First Amendment 32 WM.
&c MARY L. REv. 267 (1991).
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the stress on the manipulability of the listeners by sophisticated and
well-resourced communicators, may understate human rationality,
and understate human resistance to such distortions as long as a full
array of ideas are available for popular consideration. We must, there-
fore, now consider what we can call the assumption of rationality.
Prompted by the ideals of the Enlightenment, the assumption of ra-
tionality posits that true propositions (of fact or of value) possess some
inherent properties such that for all or most human beings the superi-
ority of true propositions to their negations will be apparent even in
the face of disparities in communicative power.37 That is, if it is the
case that P is true and not-P false, then we might assume that human
beings, by virtue of their rationality, will identify the truth of P and the
falsity of not-P even if not-P is uttered with much greater frequency,
even if not-P is uttered in an especially persuasive manner, even if not-
P is more consistent with what people might have believed prior to
hearing P, and even if not-P is more consistent with the hearers' ante-
cedent interests, desires, biases, and prejudices, than P. Thus, this as-
sumption of rationality admits the existence of inequality of resources
and of speech in the marketplace of ideas, but discounts the impor-
tance or effect of those inequalities in the communicative environ-
ment, stressing the ability of true or sound propositions, but not false
or unsound ones, to transcend the effects of the distortions and ine-
qualities. More plausibly, the assumption of rationality places confi-
dence in the ability of people-especially adult people in full control
of their faculties-to transcend many of the distortions that might be
caused by financial, social, or political inequalities in the deliberative
environment.
Once the issue is framed in this way, however, it becomes clear
that the question is more empirical than philosophical. 38 Despite the
fact that the natural response to identifying an empirical question is
(or at least ought to be) to attempt to provide an empirical answer,3 9
or test an empirical hypothesis, this may not be the best setting in
which to undertake that task. Nevertheless, it is still worth exposing
the Enlightenment-inspired empirical assumptions upon which much
37 I am not squeamish about claims of truth, but those who are may substitute
more sound and less sound, or even more useful and less useful, for truth and falsity.
Nothing in the argument in the text is weakened with the substitution.
38 Indeed, freedom of speech is an excellent example of a political principle rest-
ing on testable but rarely tested empirical assumptions.
39 Unfortunately, this is not as common in the legal academy as it ought to be,
including (or especially) in the free speech literature, as Scot Powe has powerfully
pointed out. See LA. Powe, Jr., The Supreme Court, Social Change, and Legal Scholarship,
44 STAN. L. REv. 1615 (1992).
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of traditional free speech theory has relied, for that is a step towards
understanding how to evaluate them. According to these assump-
tions, the truth (or soundness, or value, or whatever) of a proposition
has more power in explaining why people accept some propositions
and not others than do truth-independent properties such as the con-
text in which the proposition is uttered, the frequency of its utterance,
the manner in which the proposition is uttered,40 the prestige of its
utterer, and the rhetorical force of the actual way in which the propo-
sition is uttered and supported. If we wanted to predict which pro-
positions were likely to be accepted and which rejected, we could do
worse, so this assumption would have it, than to look at the soundness
of the propositions, for the sound propositions would be predicted to
have, for that reason alone, a greater chance of acceptance than the
unsound ones. But although this empirical conclusion about the in-
herent power of or visibility of truth might be true for selected groups,
whether it is true for a population at large is far from self-evident.
Again, therefore, although as a matter of ideal theory one can assume
a communicative environment in which truth will out, as a matter of
ideal theory one also has no reason to assume that the state will inter-
fere unduly with the process of truth-finding. But if as a matter of
non-ideal theory one assumes the possibility and indeed the likeli-
hood of misguided governmental intervention, then as a matter of
non-ideal theory it seems odd to assume, quite ideally, that the distor-
tions of power and persuasiveness in the marketplace of ideas are not
just as likely to produce a world in which unsound propositions re-
place sound ones just as often as sound ones replace unsound ones.41
40 This factor would include the full range of techniques that might be available
to the most sophisticated molders of public opinion, whether they exist on Madison
Avenue or anywhere else.
41 Consider the typical jury deliberation. The jury hears testimony and is
presented with exhibits over a period of several hours, several days, or several weeks.
At the dose of the evidence, the jury begins deliberating, and then attempts, by a
combination of voting and argument, to reach a (typically) unanimous consensus.
But consider for the moment a case in which at the close of the evidence nine jurors
believe (correctly) that the defendant committed an act which he denies, and that
three jurors believe (incorrectly) the defendant did not commit the act. One possibil-
ity is a decision procedure that takes a vote immediately after the dose of the evi-
dence, and treats this pre-deliberative counting of preferences as conclusive.
Assuming a majority-vote decision rule, the result here would be a verdict against the
defendant. Another possibility is what in fact exists, the opportunity to discuss and
debate-to engage in a discourse-prior to voting, followed by a relatively public (to
the other jurors) vote. Consider the circumstances under which one of the three
mistaken jurors would be able to persuade more than three of the nine non-mistaken
jurors to change a correct vote to a mistaken one. And consider the circumstances
under which one of the nine non-mistaken jurors would be able to persuade one or
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Those who would argue that discourse is a necessary condition for the
identification of truth, however (assuming again that there are criteria
for truth other than deliberative consensus), must suppose that the
holder of a true belief, by reason of the truth of that belief, is more
resistant to belief-modification from argument than is the holder of a
false belief. Perhaps this is so, but as the basis for the entrenchment
of a second-order principle applicable to an entire polity, it rests on
empirical assumptions about the intrinsic power of truth that are
hardly self-evident.
This naturally leads to the third possible assumption of both
traditional and modem deliberative theories. Even if we assume non-
equality of communicators, and even if we reject Enlightenment-in-
spired assumptions about the intrinsic power or visibility of sound
ideas and true propositions, so the argument goes, then the risks of
distortion caused by the intervention by non-ideal governments are
necessarily and systematically greater than the risks of distortion
caused by disparities of power, broadly speaking, in a governmentally-
unregulated communicative environment. Briefly, this is the assump-
tion undergirding the distinction between the public and the private,
and the assumption that the dangers of excess public power are sys-
tematically greater than the dangers of private power, applied here to
the specific question of freedom of speech.42
Here we have what is probably the most plausible of the three
assumptions I am considering-the assumption that the deeply flawed
marketplace of ideas is still less dangerous than the even more deeply
more of the mistaken jurors as to the error of his conclusions. A great deal of dis-
course theory surrounds the empirical question of when it is more likely that non-
mistaken jurors will be able to persuade mistaken jurors to change their votes (or first
impressions) and when it is more likely that mistaken jurors will be able to persuade
non-mistaken jurors to change their votes (or correct first impressions). In the con-
text of juries, some of these issues have been the subject of empirical investigation.
See, e.g., VALERIE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THEJURY (1986); INSIDE THEJUROR:
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUROR DECISION MAKING (Reid Hastie ed., 1993); REID HASTIE ET
AL., INSIDE THEJURY (1983). For an optimistic view of the lessons ofjury research on
deliberation theory, see GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 15, at 132-34. For a less
optimistic view, see Lynn Sanders, Against Deliberation (Dec. 1993) (unpublished
manuscript). And for another less optimistic view of the power of deliberating jurors
to reach sound results, see STEPHENJ. ADLER, THE JURY: TRIAL AND ERROR IN THE AMER-
ICAN COURTROOM (1994).
42 Compare Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REv. 1405
(1986), with LA. Powe,Jr., Scholarship and Markets, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 172 (1987).
Also relevant to this issue are: J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist
Approaches to the First Amendment, 1990 DUKE L.J. 375; R.H. Coase, Advertising and Free
Speech, 6J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1977); Aaron Director, The Parity of the Economic Market
Place, 7J.L. & EcON. 1 (1964).
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flawed governmental intervention-but again the assumption appears
both more empirical and more contingent than much of traditional
free speech theory has supposed. There are undoubtedly good rea-
sons to believe that when governments intervene they do so more
often in the interests of the governors than in the public interest,
43
and equally good reasons to believe that even public-minded govern-
mental action is frequently mistaken or misguided. But if we reject
the highly unrealistic assumptions of equality and rationality, then
there appear equally good reasons to believe that the distortions of
the putatively unregulated communicative environment will be
equally mistaken or misguided, and the consequences equally
problematic.
But perhaps not. Perhaps, so the argument could run, govern-
ment, by virtue of its resources, its monopoly on the legitimate use of
force, its ability to imprison, its psychological authority, and its regula-
tory pervasiveness, has powers available to it that are unavailable to
even the largest concentrations of private power, and thus has powers
to distort the communicative and deliberative processes unavailable to
even the most dominant communicators. But again this raises a nec-
essarily empirical question, and one as to which the answer again
seems hardly self-evident. When government is out of the picture, are
those remaining forces of power invariably so ineffective that there is
less limitation on communicative ability than would be the case were
government to be involved? Or is it possible that at some times and in
some places, and as to some issues, the risks of governmental interven-
tion are no greater than the risks consequent to the imbalances of
power that exist when government steps back? To put it differently,
and starkly, when the State does not decide what is to be said, who
does, and on wliat basis?4
There are strong and weak forms of the argument I have just sug-
gested. The strong form is an argument that attacks the core of the
public-private distinction, and thus questions whether there is any rea-
son to believe that the dangers of private concentrations of power are
less than the dangers of the State. As such, this argument is quite
possibly an argument against liberalism itself. If a recurring feature of
free speech argumentation is a faith in the belief that the dangers of
43 See SCHAUER, supra note 13, ch. 6.
44 Thomas Scanlon reports that he heard Herbert Marcuse (Herbert Marcuse,
Repressive Tolerance, in A CmRmTQUE OF PURE TOLERANCE (Robert Paul Wolff et al. eds.,
1969)) deliver a lecture at Princeton in the late 1960s in which Marcuse, after advocat-
ing some degree of governmental intervention against intolerant speech, was, ex-
pectedly, asked "Who decides?". "Who decides now?," Scanlon reports Marcuse as
having responded.
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government are necessarily or systematically greater than the dangers
of non-governmental power, then the principle of free speech hinges
on one of the central tenets of modern liberalism, and may remain
vulnerable to a more broad-based attack on liberalism itself.
That an attack on free speech as a distinct principle may be an
attack on liberalism itself is not a sufficient reason to reject the attack,
but nevertheless a weaker form of the argument is sufficient for my
purposes here. For even if we assume the comparatively greater dan-
gers of governmental intervention than of non-governmental dispari-
ties of power in the unregulated communicative environment, there
seems no persuasive reason to believe that this would be the case more
with respect to communication than with respect to any other mani-
festation of the public-private distinction or the central tenets of liber-
tarian liberalism. Thus one can believe that governmental power is
systematically more dangerous than the concentrations and distor-
tions of private power while still not believing that this phenomenon
has a different incidence with respect to communication than with
respect to other aspects of human action.
III
My focus here is thus on the relation between the ideal and the
non-ideal, between the aspirational and the actual, in free speech the-
ory. A slightly different way of putting the same basic point would be
to think about the different between full-compliance and partial-com-
pliance theories, 45 and to think as well about the possibility and effect
of different varieties of partial compliance theory.
So let us imagine a field of nongovernmental communicators,
and a government with the putative power to control some of the
communications of the nongovernmental communicators. And with
this distinction in place, we can imagine first a full-compliance theory,
one in which the nongovernmental communicators do not engage in
any pathological behavior (such as some speakers drowning out
others, or intimidating them from speaking, or having more commu-
nicative resources than other speakers, or using rhetorical tricks or
flat-out lies to manipulate their audiences into believing things they
ideally would not believe, or making decisions they would not other-
wise make), and in which the government behaves similarly benignly
by imposing no unnecessary restrictions on the communicative pro-
cess. Only those restrictions that are essential (such as those coordi-
nation rules necessary to prevent several speakers from speaking
45 On the differences between the two, compare JOHN RAwLS, A THEORY OF JUS-
TICE (1971), with JOHN RAWLs, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993).
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simultaneously, or those substantive rules necessary to prevent serious
communication-produced harm) would be imposed, and thus, by stip-
ulation, there would be no worry about speaker pathologies interfer-
ing with the communication process, and no worry about regulator
(government) pathologies being used unwisely or excessively.
Insofar as a principle of free speech is a second-order principle
barring what we would otherwise have good first-order reasons to
do,46 it should be clear that such a principle is unnecessary in this
variety of full-compliance theory. Where we are dealing in an ideal
world, and where we are by stipulation unconcerned with the patholo-
gies of communicators or their putative regulators, then we need be
equally unconcerned with designing principles premised on the exist-
ence of the very pathologies we have stipulated away.
If we turn away from full-compliance theories to partial-compli-
ance theories, however, we can see that these come in several varieties.
Using the same framework of benign and non-benign communicators
and regulators, one variety of partial-compliance theory would involve
benign regulators but non-benign communicators. In that case there
would be considerable need for regulation in order to control speaker
pathologies in the marketplace of ideas, but there would be no need
to worry about the pathologies of misplaced or excess governmental
regulation, and so, as in the case of full-compliance theory, there
would be no need for a second-order principle of freedom of speech
whose sole purpose is to prevent the regulator pathologies that in this
variant do not exist.
Under the next variety of partial compliance theory, however,
there would be a need for a second-order principle of freedom of
speech. If we now take up the situation in which there are no speaker
pathologies, but in which there are regulator pathologies, the argu-
ments for entrenching a second-order principle of freedom of speech
are compelling, because now there is a genuine risk of misplaced or
excess regulation, but, by stipulation, no need for any regulation at all
except the minimal regulation required by the coordination function.
46 On second-order principles in this sense, see.JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORAL=Tn OF
FREEDOM (1986); JOSEPH RAZ, PRACrICAL REASON AND NORMS (1975). For my own
elaborations on this theme, see FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RuLES: A PHILO-
SOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE (1991),
and, as applied to free speech theory, Frederick Schauer, The Second-Best First Amend-
ment; 31 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1 (1989). The closest I will ever come to committing an
act of intellectual autobiography is the observation that a principle of freedom of
speech, which immunizes numerous harmful actions that a well-working principle of
general and equal liberty would punish, strikes me as a central case of rule-based
decisionmaking and rule-sensitive institutional design.
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But because under this situation there are, by stipulation, no speaker
pathologies, there is no need for regulation designed expressly to con-
trol them.
The stipulation of the existence of regulator pathologies but the
non-existence of speaker pathologies, however, seems no more realis-
tic than the opposite stipulation of the existence of speaker patholo-
gies but the non-existence of regulator pathologies. More realistic
than either of these implausible sets of stipulations, therefore, is the
final variety of non-compliance theory, one that is premised on the
quite realistic assumption that there are both speaker pathologies and
regulator pathologies. In this scenario, there are, because of the
speaker pathologies, frequent needs for regulation, but there are, be-
cause of the regulator pathologies, good reasons to suppose that many
of those regulations will be misguided. Thus, although the speaker
pathologies would seem to generate the need for regulation to deal
with distortions in the discursive arena, there would be strong reason
to suspect that attempts at regulation would be both under- and over-
inclusiveness-there would be a failure to regulate when necessary,
and there would be regulation when unnecessary.
Although there is good reason to suspect the wisdom of any given
regulatory act given the distinct possibility of either under- or over-
regulation, the existence of the speaker pathologies provides good
reason to suspect as well the operation of the unregulated communi-
cative environment. And thus, although this variety of partial-compli-
ance theory is the only one with any claim to accurately reflect the
world, recognizing the existence of full-compliance theory as well as
the other varieties of partial compliance theory makes clear that the
central question is one of determining whether the expected negative
consequences of misguided regulation are less than the expected neg-
ative consequences of misguided but unregulated speaker patholo-
gies. And as with any other form of regulatory strategy, there is little
reason to believe that this determination can be totally divorced from
inevitably shifting patterns of regulation and patterns of unregulated
conduct. In other words, while there may be good reasons for believ-
ing that instrumental and strategic free speech principles will be salu-
tary at specific times and places, and in specific institutional contexts,
there are fewer reasons to believe that the necessity of such principles
can be imagined to be an atemporal, ahistorical, and universal
imperative.
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IV
Much of the foregoing can be seen as a call for empirical investi-
gation of issues whose empirical dimension has traditionally been ig-
nored by political and legal theorists for whom empirical investigation
is not their natural or comparative advantage. But even apart from
this issue, my claims thus far cannot be taken, even if empirically sup-
ported, as an argument against a distinct principle of freedom of
speech, 47 since they are, at best, only an argument against one argu-
ment for such a principle, and not an argument against all arguments
for such a principle. But although all of the foregoing by itself thus
does not constitute a complete argument against recognition of a dis-
tinct second-order principle of freedom of speech, it may, in conjunc-
tion with other arguments I do not address here, and in conjunction
with yet-to-be-established empirical evidence, point in that direction.
And that is not because pointing out the consequences of the dispari-
ties in communicative power detracts from the importance of commu-
nication. On the contrary, it is the upshot of much of what I say here
to challenge the marginalization of communication that seems the un-
spoken assumption of much of free speech theory. Discourse, dia-
logue, discussion, deliberation, communication-these are not
activities that take place apart from and alongside the rest of our exist-
ence. More plausibly, these activities are so intrinsic to and constitu-
tive of our existence that trying to carve out a unique political realm
for communicative action seems, when put that way, counter-intui-
tive.48 So by focusing on governmentally unregulated communication
as still containing all of the pathologies of (and virtues of) social life in
general, I mean to question a distinct principle of freedom of speech,
but by no means to question the value of speech itself. Still, it may be
important to see what, and more vitally what does not, flow from even
47 The best existing explanation of what a satisfactory account of a free speech
principle would have to look like is R. Kent Greenawalt, Free Speech Justifications, 89
CoLUM. L. REv. 119 (1989).
48 See Schauer, The Phenomenology of Speech and Harm, supra note 16. As I under-
stand it, this is one of the running themes in CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, ONLY WoRDS
(1993). Maclinnon's arguments about the communicative dimensions of physical
actions and the physical dimensions of communicative actions are aimed at undercut-
ting the speech-action distinction that is a necessary component of any free speech
principle. See also SusanJ. Brison, Speech, Harm, and the Mind-Body Problem in First
AmendmentJurisprudence, Address at the Annual Meeting of the American Philosophi-
cal Association (Dec. 1996) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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the seemingly extreme conclusion that there may not be any defensi-
ble second-order principle of freedom of speech at all.
4 9
Even if we cannot nowjustify a distinct free speech principle, per-
haps it is the case that a second-order principle of free speech endures
for special historical and political reasons rather than because of its
philosophical soundness. Whatever the philosophical soundness of a
free speech argument, a free speech argument has great political and
social force in many societies, especially this one.50 And given this
fact, the free speech principle may persist, and even in a second-order
way be justifiable, just because it serves important and morally defensi-
ble current purposes in a decidedly non-ideal world. Suppose I be-
lieve (which I do) that capital punishment is unjust in all
circumstances. And suppose I live in a society that for arcane, mystic
reasons believes, erroneously, that people with green eyes have special
powers and should therefore be entitled to special privileges. The
question then might arise whether green-eyed people should be ex-
empt from capital punishment in this society that has, let us assume,
explicitly refused to eliminate capital punishment. If this proposal
were to be made, it is quite possible that I would support a principle
that draws a dubious distinction between the green-eyed and everyone
else just because that principle, but no other at the moment, will re-
duce the incidence of the practice of capital punishment that I find
49 I put aside here questions related to interpretation of a written constitution. It
is possible (and, to me, desirable, see Frederick Schauer, Constitutional Invocations, 65
FORDHAM L. REV. 1295 (1997); Frederick Schauer, An Essay on Constitutional Language,
29 UCLA L. REv. 797 (1982); Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509 (1988))
that the interpretive constraints of the role of interpreter would produce different
conclusions in the interpretation of the language of the First Amendment, which,
after all, does contain a free speech clause, than in the case of a decision of political
theory or public policy not involving interpretation of the concrete words "the free-
dom of speech." The more ephemeral point, but one I believe correct for reasons I
cannot yet work out satisfactorily, is that it is easier to work out a theory of free
speech, if free speech is presupposed to exist as a distinct principle, than it is tojustify
a free speech principle in a world without that presupposition.
50 And this is why public advocates seek to couch their claims in free speech
terms, since a free speech argument can so easily in the United States claim the rhe-
torical high ground. The rhetorical beauty of the argument from silencing, see MacK-
innon, supra note 31; Frank I. Michelman, Conceptions of Democracy in American
Constitutional Argument: The Case of Pornography Regulation, 56 TENN. L. REV. 291
(1989), is that it makes the case for control in the language of free speech, and thus
commands greater political attention in the world in which we live, than making the
case for control in the language of equality. See also Frederick Schauer, The Ontology of
Censorship, in CENSORSHIP AND SILENCING (Robert C. Post ed., forthcoming 1998).
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abhorrent 5' As with the question whether it would be a better world
than the one we have now if there were no poverty for people whose
names begin with "Q," arbitrary principles may at times produce bet-
ter results in non-ideal settings than any of the available alternatives.
So too, perhaps, with freedom of speech. Even if it is the case
that communication is less distinguishable from other exercises of
human liberty than is often supposed, the discourse of free speech
may still, like the special immunity for green-eyed people from capital
punishment, serve to minimize the restrictions on liberty that in a bet-
ter world would be eliminated directly and without recourse to the
language of free speech qua free speech. But short of that better
world, principles with strong historical provenance and equally strong
current emotional political appeal may produce desirable results just
because the general protection of liberty remains so suboptimal.
Moreover, if, as is the case under existing American constitutional
doctrine, general and unjustified restrictions on personal liberty are
immune from judicial invalidation,52 then a distinct principle of free-
dom of speech might once again, as in the flag-burning cases,5 3 pro-
vide the pragmatically necessary way to eliminate a restriction that
ideally could be eliminated just by seeing it as an unjustified restric-
tion on liberty simpliciter.
And thus it is a mistake to equate skepticism about the philosoph-
ical soundness of a distinct second-order principle of freedom of
speech with a desire to restrict speech. One could believe there to be
no sound and distinct principle of freedom of speech while still believ-
ing that, for example, death warrants against Salman Rushdie and
criminal prohibitions on the distribution of erotica 54 and imprison-
ment for burning the American flag, were deontologically unjust or
consequentially undesirable restrictions on liberty. But as long as the
principle of liberty simpliciter carries a less impressive historical prove-
nance than the principle of free speech, or as long as the generalized
enforcement by the courts of a principle of liberty creates separate
51 Those who find the example excessively counterfactual can substitute astrology
as an example of a widely held but no less spurious method of distinguishing people
and events.
52 See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986); Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S.
238 (1976); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973). The claim in the text
may be less strong than it was in even the recent past, or at least that may be a plausi-
ble inference from some of the language, even if not the holding, in Cruzan v. Director,
Missouri Department of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
53 United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990); Texas v.Johnson, 491 U.S. 397
(1989).
54 I use the term "erotica" to refer to sexually explicit written or printed material
not involving violence or coercion, either in its production or in its imagery.
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problems of the scope of judicial power, it may be that the use of a
distinct (and narrower) second-order principle of freedom of speech
will remain as a pragmatically useful way of achieving greater liberty as
long as a simpler principle of liberty is destined to remain
underenforced.
This pragmatic gain, however, does not come without cost. For if
it is the case that a categorical protection of free speech protects cer-
tain communicative activities that would not be protected by a simple
principle of liberty,55 then the over-protection of speech to help guard
against the under-protection of liberty can only be calibrated with ref-
erence to the consequences not only of the under-protection of lib-
erty, but also of the over-protection of speech. And it is only by
considering the relationship between free speech and private power,
and only by considering speech as both a manifestation of power and
a process that is influenced by its distribution, can we fully consider all
of the consequences involved.
Yet although critical thinking about discourse may bear fruit for
the enterprise of theorizing about (negative) rights to freedom of
speech and freedom of the press, such critical thinking may be even
more valuable in considering the extent to which discourse should be
built into a given decision procedure, and the extent to which dis-
course should actively be encouraged. To encourage discourse as part
of public decisionmaking, and especially to devote scarce financial
and other resources to that encouragement, is to presuppose particu-
lar advantages that more public discourse will bring. That public dis-
course will often bring advantages is undeniable, but that public
discourse brings disadvantages that will sometimes outweigh its advan-
tages is a problem that is too rarely confronted.
It is a plausible interpretation of all that I have said here, how-
ever, that I am not the one to confront these issues. A strong infer-
ence from my argument is that the question of the benefits of
discourse for human decisionmaking is, to repeat, more an empirical
than a theoretical question (assuming that the two are different, or
that at least they represent different approaches).56 Although some
existing research in social psychology addresses some of these ques-
55 I am thinking here primarily of speech that is intentionally (see Collin v. Smith,
578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978); Village of Skokie v. National Socialist Party of Am., 373
N.E.2d 21 (Ill. 1978)) or recklessly (see Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., No. 96-2412 (4th
Cir., decision pending, 1997); Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 565 F. Supp. 802
(S.D. Tex. 1983), motion to dismiss denied, 583 F. Supp. 1566 (S.D. Tex. 1984), rev'd 814
F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1987)) harm-producing.
56 In correspondence with me, Gary King has put the point more strongly: "The
literature [on freedom of speech and on deliberation] is entirely theoretical but the
[VCOL- 72:51332
DISCOURSE AND ITS DISCONTENTS
tions,57 one can imagine an experiment focused more on the existing
empirical hypotheses of free speech theory and doctrine, or an experi-
ment designed to test more crisply the advantages and disadvantages
of each of the five decision procedures I have described in reaching a
correct result. We could, for example, randomly assign people to five
different treatment groups tracking the five methods I describe, and
then measure such dependent variables as (1) how quickly is a deci-
sion reached; (2) how creative is the solution; (3) how satisfied are the
participants with the outcome; and (4) is the outcome correct, for
those outcomes in which there is an identifiably correct answer.
Other variables are easily imaginable.5 8 Such a course of research
(although possibly with a different research design) might enable us
to determine better than empirical assertions masquerading as theory
just what is the relationship between discourse and the ability to iden-
tify truth. A great deal of free speech theory and a great deal of dis-
course theory is marked by an admirable epistemological optimism,
but whether that epistemological optimism is well-founded is in the
final analysis an empirical question, as to which the resources of con-
temporary social science research might help to locate an answer.
Even were we to determine that discourse might not be a very
good way of determining the truth of some proposition of fact or
value, it might still be the case that discourse serves truth-independent
values such as equality and participation. My strong sense is that these
values, more than values of moral, political, or factual epistemology,
are at the heart of much of the contemporary celebration of dis-
course. And there is, in itself, nothing wrong with this. A decision-
making procedure that is more participatory, more inclusive, and
more egalitarian may serve politically and morally desirable purposes
even if it produces worse outcomes with respect to particular deci-
sions, and it may turn out that the cost of the worse array of outcomes
is less than the benefit of greater equality and greater participation of
people in the decisions that affect their lives. But if this is the case,
then it may turn out that the adoption of discourse as a decisionmak-
ing mechanism is not the easy one involving many benefits and no
question about the benefits of discourse for human decisionmaking is an empirical
question."
57 See, e.g., John W. Payne et al., Behavioral Decision Research: A Constructive Process-
ingPerspective, 43 ANN. REv. PSYCHOL. 87 (1992); Eldar Shafir et al., Reason-based Choice,
49 COGNrnON 11 (1993); Douglas H. Wedell, Distinguishing Among Models of Contextu-
ally Induced Preference Reversals, 17 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: LEARNING, MEMORY, &
COGNITION 767 (1991).
58 One can imagine similar research designed to measure the related question of
the desirability of the adversary system as a way of determining factual truth.
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costs, but the harder one of whether the benefits of discourse out-
weigh its costs, a question unlikely to have a universal or acontextual
answer.
FREDERICK SCH-AUER
Frederick Schauer is Academic Dean and Frank Stanton Professor of
the First Amendment, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard
University. Formerly Professor of Law at the University of Michigan, he
has also been the Cutler Professor of Law at the College of William and
Mary, Visiting Professor of Law at the University of Chicago, William Mor-
ton Distinguished Visiting Professor of the Humanities at Dartmouth Col-
lege, and the Ewald Distinguished Visiting Professor of Law at the
University of Virginia. He is the author of The Law of Obscenity (BNA
1976), Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiy (Cambridge 1982), and Playing by
the Rules: A Philosophical Examination of Rule-Based Decision-Making in Law
and in Life (Clarendon Press 1991); and co-author of The Philosophy of
Law: Classic and Contemporary Readings with Commentary (Harcourt Brace
1996) and The First Amendment: A Reader (West 1992, 1996). He has au-
thored numerous articles in legal and philosophical journals, including
Slippery Slopes and On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation in the
Harvard Law Review, Formalism in the Yale Law Journal, Uncoupling Free
Speech in the Columbia Law Review, Precedent and Giving Reasons in the Stan-
ford Law Review, Exceptions and Opinions as Rules in the University of Chicago
Law Review, The Phenomenology of Speech and Harm and Acts, Omissions, and
Constitutionalism in Ethics, and Can Rights Be Abused? in Philosophical Quar-
terly. Formerly Chair of the Association of American Law Schools Section
on Constitutional Law, he is Vice President of the American Society for
Political and Legal Philosophy, a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts
and Sciences, and a founding co-editor of the journal Legal Theory.
BOOKS
THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: CLASSIC AND CONTEMPORARY READINGS WITH
COMMENTARY (1996) (with Walter Sinnott-Armstrong).
Supplements to GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw (1983-1996).
THE FIRST AMENDMENT: A READER (1992; 2d ed. 1996) (with John H.
Garvey).
LAw AND LANGUAGE (Frederick Schauer ed., 1993).
PLAYINc BY THE RULEs: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DE-
CISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE (1991; paperback ed. 1992).
FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY (1982).
THE LAw OF OBSCENTY (1976).
1335
1336 NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW [VOL. 72:5
CONTRIBUTIONS
The Ontology of Censorship, in CENSORSHIP AND SILENCING (Robert Post ed.,
forthcoming 1997).
Positivism as Pariah, in THE AUTONOMY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LEGAL PosrIv-
ISM 31 (Robert P. George ed., 1996).
Amending the Presuppositions of a Constitution, in RESPONDING TO IMPERFEC-
TION: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT
145 (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995).
Free Speech in a World of Private Power, in FREEDOM OF COMMUNICATION 1
(Tom Campbell & Wojciech Sadurski eds., 1994).
Speaking of Dignity, in THE CONSTITUTION OF RIGHTS: HUMAN DIGNITY AND
AMERICAN VALUES 178 (Michael J. Meyer & William A. Parent eds.,
1992).
Freedom of Speech, in THE READER'S COMPANION TO AMERICAN HISTORY 421
(Eric Foner &John A. Garraty eds., 1991).
Freedom of the Press, in THE READER'S COMPANION TO AMERICAN HISTORY
422 (Eric Foner &John A. Garraty eds., 1991).
Miller v. California; Paris Adult Theatre v. Slaton, in THE OXFORD COM-
PANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 548 (Kermit
L. Hall et al. eds., 1992).
Roth v. United States; Alberts v. California, in THE OxFom COMPANION
TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 745 (Kermit L. Hall et
al. eds., 1992).
Stanley v. Georgia, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE UNITED STATES 745 (Kermit L. Hall et al. eds., 1992).
The Bork Nomination, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TION 45 (Leonard W. Levy et al. eds., Supp. 1 1992).
Children and the First Amendment, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 69 (Leonard W. Levy et al. eds., Supp. 1 1992).
Who Decides?, in DEMOCRACY AND THE MASS MEDIA 202 (Judith Lichten-
berg ed., 1990).
The Varied Uses of Constitutional History, Introduction to WILLIAM E. NELSON
& ROBERT C. PALMER, LIBERTY AND COMMUNITY. CONSTITUTION AND
RIGHTS IN THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1 (1987).
New York Times Co. v. United States, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERI-
CAN CONSTITUTION 1313 (Leonard W. Levy et al. eds., 1986).
FREDERICK SCHAUER
Religious Advocacy and Religious Legislation: A Constitutional Paradox, in CON-
CEIVED IN CONSCIENCE 57 (Richard A. Rutyna &John W. Kuehl eds.,
1983).
Obscenity: Legal Aspects, in 3 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 1086
(Sanford H. Kadish ed., 1983).
Free Speech and the Paradox of Tolerance, in VALUEs IN CONFLICT: LIFE, Lm-
ERT Y, AND THE RuLE OF LAW 228 (Burton M. Leiser ed., 1981).
ARTICLES
Legal Positivism as Legal Information, 82 CORNELL L. REv. (forthcoming
1997) (with VirginiaJ. Wise).
Prescriptions in Three Dimensions, 82 IowA L. REV. (forthcoming 1997).
Generality and Equality, 16 LAw & PHIL. (forthcoming 1997).
OnExtrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110 HARv. L. REv. 1359 (1997)
(with Larry Alexander).
Constitutional Invocations, 65 FoRDHAm L. REv. 1295 (1997).
On the Degree of Confidence for Adverse Decisions, 25J. LEGAL STUD. 27 (1996)
(with Richard Zeckhauser).
Ashwander Revisited, 1995 Sup. CT. REv. 71.
Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REv. 633 (1995).
Opinions as Rules, 62 U. CHI. L. REv. 1455 (1995).
Too Hard: Unconstitutional Conditions and the Chimera of Constitutional Con-
sistency, 72 DENv. U. L. REV. 989 (1995).
Fuller's Internal Point of View, 13 LAw & PHIL. 285 (1994).
Judicial Review of the Devices of Democracy, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1326 (1994).
Cheap Tolerance, 9 SvrHEs m PHILOSOPHICA 439 (1994) (with Richard
Zeckhauser).
Commensurability and its Constitutional Consequences, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 785
(1994).
Constitutional Positivism, 25 CONN. L. REv. 797 (1993) (The Day, Berry
&Howard Lecture).
Free Speech and the Cultural Contingency of Constitutional Categories, 14 CAR-
DOZO L. REV. 865 (1993).
The Phenomenology of Speech and Harm, 103 ETHmCS 635 (1993).
19971 1337
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
The Political Incidence of the Free Speech Principle, 64 U. COLO. L. REv. 935
(1993).
A Comment on the Structure of Rights, 27 GA. L. REv. 415 (1993).
Uncoupling Free Speech, 92 COLuM. L. REv. 1321 (1992).
Messages, Motives, and Hate Crimes, CRiM. JUST. ETHICS, Summer/Fall 1992,
at 52.
The Questions of Authority, 81 GEo. LJ. 95 (1992) (The Philip Hart Memo-
rial Lecture).
The Occasions of Constitutional Interpretation, 72 B.U. L. REv. 729 (1992).
The Practice and Problems of Plain Meaning: A Response to Aleinikoff and Shaw,
45 VAND. L. REv. 715 (1992).
The First Amendment as Ideology, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 853 (1992).
Exceptions, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 871 (1991).
Rules and the Rule of Law, 14 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 645 (1991).
The Rules ofJurisprudence: A Reply, 14 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 839 (1991)
(reply following responses to Rules and the Rule of Law, 14 HARv. J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 645 (1991)).
Reflections on the Value of Truth, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 699 (1991).
The Authority of Legal Scholarship, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 1003 (1991).
The Calculus of Distrust, 77 VA. L. REv. 653 (1991).
Statutory Construction and the Coordinating Function of Plain Meaning, 1990
Sup. CT. REV. 231.
Rules and the Rule-Following Argument, 3 CANADIAN J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE
187 (1990).
A Brief Note on the Logic of Rules, with Special Reference to Bowen v. Ge-
orgetown University Hospital, 42 ADMIN. L. REv. 447 (1990).
Judicial Self-Understanding and the Internalization of Constitutional Rules, 61
U. COLO. L. REv. 749 (1990).
Mrs. Palsgraf and the First Amendment, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 161 (1990).
The Second-Best First Amendment, 31 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1 (1989) (Cutler
Lecture).
The Aim and the Target in Free Speech Methodology, 83 Nw. U. L. REv. 562
(1989).
Rules, the Rule of Law, and the Constitution, 6 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY
69 (1989).
Judging in a Corner of the Law, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 1717 (1988).
1308I [VOIL. 72:5
FREDERICK SCHAUER
Formalism, 97 YALE LJ. 509 (1988).
Commercial Speech and the Architecture of the First Amendment, 56 U. CQN. L.
REv. 1181 (1988).
Causation Theory and the Causes of Sexual Violence, 1987 AM. B. FouND. RES.
J. 737.
Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REv. 571 (1987).
Rights as Rules, 6 LAw & PHi.. 115 (1987).
The Constitution as Text and Rule, 29 WM. & MARY L. REv. 41 (1987).
Authority and Indeterminacy, 29 Nomos 28 (1987).
The Role of the People in First Amendment Theory, 74 CAL. L. REv. 761 (1986).
May Officials Think Religiously?, 27 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1075 (1986).
Slippery Slopes, 99 H&Av. L. REv. 361 (1985).
Cuban Cigars, Cuban Books, and the Problem of Incidental Restrictions on Com-
munications, 26 WM. & MARY L. REv. 779 (1985).
Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 399 (1985).
Liars, Novelists, and the Law of Defamation, 51 BRooK. L. REv. 233 (1985).
Must Speech Be Special?, 78 Nw. U. L. REv. 1284 (1984).
Public Figures, 25 WM. & MARY L. REv. 905 (1984).
Free Speech and the Argument from Democracy, 25 Nomos 241 (1983).
Refining the Lawmaking Function of the Supreme Court, 17 U. MICH. J.L. RE-
FORM 1 (1983).
Rights and the Right to Know, 14 PHMOSOPHIC EXCHANGE 65 (1983).
Codifying the First Amendment: New York v. Ferber, 1982 Sup. CT. REv. 285.
An Essay on Constitutional Language, 29 UCLA L. REv. 797 (1982).
Can Rights Be Abused?, 31 PHIL. Q. 225 (1981).
Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 VAND. L. REv. 265
(1981).
Search and Seizure of Obscene Materials, 8 SEARCH & SEIZuRE L. REP. 85
(1981).
Social Foundations of the Law of Defamation: A Comparative Analysis, 1 J. ME-
DIA L. & PRAcr. 1 (1981).
"Private" Speech and the "Private" Forum: Givhan v. Western Line School
District, 1979 Sup. CT. REv. 217.
Speech and "Speech"--Obscenity and "Obscenity" An Exercise in the Interpreta-
tion of Constitutional Language, 67 GEO. L.J. 899 (1979).
1997] 1339
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
Pornography and the First Amendment, 40 U. PITT. L. REv. 605 (1979).
Language, Truth, and the First Amendment: An Essay in Memory of Harry
Canter, 64 VA. L. REv. 263 (1978).
Fear, Risk and the First Amendment: Unraveling the "Chilling Effect, "58 B.U. L.
REv. 685 (1978).
Reflections on "Contemporary Community Standards": The Perpetuation of an Ir-
relevant Concept in the Law of Obscenity, 56 N.C. L. REv. 1 (1978).
Hudgens v. NLRB and the Problem of State Action in First Amendment Adjudi-
cation, 61 MINN. L. REv. 433 (1977).
The Return of Variable Obscenity?, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 1275 (1977).
Article 10 and Freedom of Expression: An Examination of Deference to National
Authority Under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights,
POLY L. REv., Spring 1978, at 25.
English Natural Justice and American Due Process: An Analytical Comparison,
18 WM. & MARY L. REv. 47 (1976).
School Books, Lesson Plans, and the Constitution, 78 W. VA. L. REv. 287
(1976).
Obscenity and the Conflict of Laws, 77 W. VA. L. REv. 377 (1975).
ESSAYS, BOOK REVIEWS, AND PAPERS
Acts, Omissions, and Constitutionalism, 105 ETHICS 916 (1995) (essay on
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION (1993)).
Critical Notice, 24 CANADIAN J. PHIL. 495 (1994) (reviewing ROGER A.
SHINER, NoRM AND NATURE: THE MOvEMENTS OF LEGAL THOUGHT
(1992)).
Discourse and Its Discontents, Joan Shorenstein Barone Center on the Press,
Politics and Public Policy, John F. Kennedy School of Government,
Harvard University, Working Paper 94-2 (1994).
Deliberating About Deliberation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1187 (1992) (reviewing
BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: 1: FOUNDATIONS (1991)).
The Determinants of Legal Doubt, 89 MICH. L. REv. 1295 (1991) (reviewing
KARL LLEWELLYN, THE CASE LAW SYSTEM IN AMERicA (Paul Gewirtz
ed., Michael Ansaldi trans., 1989)).
Parsing the Pentagon Papers, Joan Shorenstein Barone Center on the Press,
Politics and Public Policy, John F. Kennedy School of Government,
Harvard University, Research Paper R-3 (1991).
(VOL. 72:51340
FREDERICK SCHAUER
Constitutional Conventions, 87 MICH. L. REv. 1407 (1989) (reviewing LAU-
RENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2d ed. 1988)).
Harry Kalven and the Perils of Particularism, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 397 (1989)
(reviewing HARRY KALVEN, JR., A WORTHY TRADITION: FREEDOM OF
SPEECH IN AMERICA (Janie Kalven ed., 1988)).
Is the Common Law Law?, 77 CAL. L. REv. 455 (1989) (reviewing MELVIN
ARON EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW (1988)).
Marking Time, 77 GEO. LJ. 1959 (1989) (reviewing MARK TUSHNET, RED,
WHITE, AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
(1988)).
Thejurisprudence of Reasons, 85 MICH. L. REV. 847 (1987) (reviewing RON-
AL) DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986)).
Opinions as Rules, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 682 (1986) (reviewing BERNARD
SCHWARTZ, THE UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS OF THE WARREN COURT
(1985)).
Lawyers and Lawmaking, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1141 (1985) (reviewing BRUCE
A. ACKERMAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LAW (1984)).
Does Doctrine Matter?, 82 MICH. L. REv. 655 (1984) (reviewing THE BURGER
COURT: THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT WASN'T (Vincent Blasi ed.,
1983)).
Free Speech and the Demise of the Soapbox, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 558 (1984)
(reviewing ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM
(1983)).
Decriminalization and the Constitution, CRinm. JUST. ETHmICS, Winter/Spring
1984, at 76 (reviewing DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, SEX, DRUGS, DTH AND
THE LAW: AN ESSAY ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND OVERCRIMINALIZATION
(1982)).
Is Government Speech a Problem?, 35 STAN. L. REv. 373 (1983) (reviewing
MARK G. YUDOF, WHEN GoVERNmENT SPEAKS: POLiTICS, LAW, AND
GOvERNMENT EXPRESSION IN AMERICA (1983)).
Free Speech and the Assumption of Rationality, 36 VAND. L. REv. 199 (1983)
(reviewing FRANKLYN S. HAIMAN, SPEECH AND LAW IN A FRm SoaITci
(1981)).
1997] 1341

